Tapp v. State Supplemental Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43347 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-3-2016
Tapp v. State Supplemental Appellant's Brief Dckt.
43347
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Tapp v. State Supplemental Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43347" (2016). Not Reported. 2573.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2573
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
CHRISTOPHER C. TAPP, 
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent.
__________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
S.Ct. No.  43347
Bonneville Co. CV-2012-5881
__________________________________
APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
__________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Bonneville
__________________________________
HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY,
District Judge
__________________________________
Dennis Benjamin Lawrence Wasden
ISBA # 4199 Idaho Attorney General
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP Jessica Lorello, Deputy
303 W. Bannock St. Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 2772 P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83701 Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 343-1000 (208) 344-4534
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent
 i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
  
I. Table of Authorities  ........................................................................................... ii 
 
II. Supplemental Statement of the Case  ................................................................ 1 
   
III. Supplemental Issue Presented on Appeal ......................................................... 3 
 
IV. Supplemental Argument .................................................................................... 4 
 
V. Conclusion  ........................................................................................................ 7 
 ii 
   TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
 
FEDERAL CASES  
 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ............................................................ 1, 3, 4, 5 
 
STATE CASES  
 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 215 P.3d 485 (2009) ........................................... 5 
 
DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009) .............................................. 6 
 
Goff v. H.J.H. Co., 95 Idaho 837, 521 P.2d 661 (1974), citing Munroe v. Sullivan 
Mining Co., 69 Idaho 348, 207 P.2d 547 (1949) ................................................. 5 
 
Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 320 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 2014), citing Strickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263 (1999) ............................................................................................. 4 
 
Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 363 P.3d 365 (2015) ................................................. 4 
 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) ............................................. 6 
 
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014) .................................................. 4 
 
Pierce v. Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274, 301 P.2d 1099 (1956) ............................................ 5 
 
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987) .................................... 5 
 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................... 4 
 
Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1995) .................................................... 4 
 
STATE STATUTES AND RULES 
 
Idaho Code § 19-4903  ................................................................................................... 1 
 
Idaho Code § 19-4906  ................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5, 6  
 
Idaho Code § 19-4907  ................................................................................................... 4  
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57 ................................................................................................. 4 
 
 
 
1II.  SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Tapp alleged a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in his
second successive post-conviction petition and attached affidavits in support of his
claim that the state withheld evidence regarding the involvement of Jeff Smith in
the murder of Angie Dodge.  R 8, 22, 24.  However, he did not ask the district court
to take judicial notice of the transcripts of the criminal trial.  He also did not attach
the criminal case record to the petition, per I.C. § 19-4903, or recite why it was not
attached.  At the same time, the state failed to “file with its answer the record or
portions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the application” as
required by I.C. § 19-4906(a).  R 23-26.  Nor did it ask the court to take judicial
notice of the criminal case trial transcripts.  Finally, the court did not take judicial
notice of the transcripts sua sponte. 
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal arguing that Mr. Tapp had
not presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case.  R 16.  The state
denied the evidence was either suppressed or exculpatory.  It argued the evidence
was not exculpatory in light of the evidence at the criminal trial:
In this case, Petitioner implies that testimonial evidence from
witnesses regarding another person of interest, Jeff Smith, meets this
requirement. However, this information does little to help the
Petitioner. At his criminal trial the Petitioner's defense argued that his
confession was coerced or false. Testimony regarding another possible
suspect does not exculpate or impeach Mr. Tapp's confession. Indeed
the confession stands for itself as proof of the Petitioner’s guilt- thus,
the information that Petitioner claims as either exculpatory or
impeaching, does nothing to cast doubt on the Petitioner's
incriminating confession. Therefore the Petitioner’s claim must fail
2this prong because the claimed information is not exculpatory or
impeaching for Mr. Tapp.
R 37.
It also argued that the evidence was not material as “the outcome would have
been the same.”  R 40.  Again, the state’s argument referred to the criminal case
record.
This goes back to the Petitioner’s defense at trial.  His defense tried to
demonstrate that his confession was coerced or false.  There was
evidence that someone else was involved, but that did not exonerate
the Petitioner’s confession.  Indeed that particular evidence, semen,
did not even match Jeff Smith’s.  Even if Jeff Smith was involved in
some other way with Angie Dodge’s rape and murder, his involvement
does not affect Petitioner’s guilt nor negate his confession.
R 40.
The court agreed with the state’s argument.  T pg. 66, ln. 14; R 214.  It found
that the evidence was not exculpatory nor material because Mr. Tapp admitted to
participating in the murder with others.  It stated, “[t]he conviction was not based
on DNA.  It was not based upon identification of anyone else involved.  It was based
on the confession and certain circumstantial evidence.  Smith’s involvement or non-
involvement, I’m just not seeing how that exculpates Christopher Tapp.”  T pg. 65,
ln. 11-16.
A final judgment was entered.  R 216.  A timely Notice of Appeal was filed.  R
226.
On March 22, 2016, Mr. Tapp filed his Opening Brief.  He argued that the
new evidence was, in light of the criminal court record, both exculpatory and
3material under Brady.  Along with the brief, he filed a motion asking this Court to
take judicial notice of its files and records in his previous three appeals.  The Court
denied that motion without prejudice asking counsel “to identify the specific
documents this Court is asked to take judicial notice of and specifically whether the
district court was asked to take judicial notice of the same documents.” Order
Denying Motion to Take Judicial Notice Without Prejudice.  Mr. Tapp filed a
Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice specifically identifying the trial transcripts
from the direct appeal in the criminal case (State v. Tapp, No. 25295) be taken
judicial notice of and noting that the district court was not asked to take judicial
notice thereof.  The Court denied the Renewed Motion on April 27, 2016.  Order
Denying Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice.
Mr. Tapp now files this Supplemental Brief.   
III.  SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Is the district court’s finding that the withheld evidence was not exculpatory
under Brady v. Maryland, in light of the defense at the criminal trial, not supported
by sufficient evidence in the record as it is based upon the court’s prior knowledge of
the criminal court proceedings, and the transcript of the criminal trial was not
taken judicial notice of, was not introduced as an exhibit, and was not filed with the
state’s answer as required by I.C. §19-4906(a)?
4IV.  SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
Remand is Required Because the District Court’s Resolution of the Brady
Claim Is Based on Evidence Outside of the Record Before the Court.
A Brady claim has three components: 1) that the evidence at issue is
favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; 2) that the
evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 3) that
the evidence was material because there is a reasonable probability that its
disclosure to the defense would have led to a different result. Hall v. State, 156
Idaho 125, 129-30, 320 P.3d 1284, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 2014), citing Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).  On review, this Court will not disturb the
district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  However, it
exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the
facts.  Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 363 P.3d 365, 369-70 (2015); Murray v.
State, 156 Idaho 159, 163–64, 321 P.3d 709, 713–14 (2014).
It is well-established that a post-conviction relief proceeding is civil in nature
and thus governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho
806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19–4907(a) (“All rules and statutes
applicable in civil proceedings including pre-trial, discovery and appellate
procedures are available to the parties.”).  With the exception of the provisions of
discovery, post-conviction cases are “filed by the clerk of the court as a separate civil
case and [are] processed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”  I.C.R. 57(b). 
That is why the “summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under
5I.C. § 19-4906(c)” has been called “the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56.”  Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987).  The moving
party in a summary judgment motion bears the burden of proving the absence of
material facts.  Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 485, 489 (2009).
Here, there was no evidence in the record from which the court could make a
determination whether or not the evidence was exculpatory or material under
Brady.  Even though the state argued that the evidence was neither exculpatory nor
material due to the nature of Mr. Tapp’s defense, it failed to provide the record of
the criminal case trial to the district court.  In so failing, the state violated its duty
under I.C. § 19-4906)(a), which provides in relevant part, that:
In considering the application the court shall take account of substance
regardless of defects of form. If the application is not accompanied by
the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the respondent shall
file with its answer the record or portions thereof that are material to
the questions raised in the application.
Id (emphasis added).  As the petition was not accompanied by the record of the
criminal proceedings, the state was required to provide it, especially as it was the
party moving for summary disposition.  See, Chandler v. Hayden, supra.  “The word
shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.”  Goff v. H.J.H. Co., 95 Idaho 837, 839,
521 P.2d 661, 663 (1974), citing Munroe v. Sullivan Mining Co., 69 Idaho 348, 207
P.2d 547 (1949); Pierce v. Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274, 301 P.2d 1099 (1956).  In
addition, the state did not ask the court to take judicial notice of the criminal case
1  But see, DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009)
(distinguishing case from Matthews and stating that trial court did not err by
failing to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal case sua sponte.)  This case
is distinguishable from DeRushé, however, because the district court here, like the
court in Matthews, drew upon its prior knowledge of the trial proceedings where the
district court in DeRushé merely granted the state’s motion which “asserted that
DeRushé had failed to present any admissible evidence showing he was entitled to
relief.” DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho at 603, 200 P.3d at 1152.  DeRushé is further
distinguishable because the petitioner did not argue that the state failed in its duty
to provide the relevant portions of the record. 
6
nor did the court do so sua sponte.
Without the criminal court proceeding before it, the district court had no
evidentiary basis to determine whether the withheld evidence was exculpatory or
material under Brady.  See, Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215,
1222 (1992).  In Matthews, the district court stated that it was taking judicial notice
of its recollected testimony from a previous trial.  The Supreme Court found that to
be inadequate and remanded, holding “that prior to dismissing a petition for
post-conviction relief, the district court is required to obtain that portion of the trial
transcript as is necessary to a determination . . . that there are no material issues of
fact and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. I.C. §
19–4906(b).”1  Here, the finding that the new evidence was not exculpatory or
material under Brady in light of the defense and evidence at trial is clearly
erroneous because there is no evidence in the record as to what the defense or
evidence at trial might be.
Remand is required because there is no way for this Court to determine
7whether the district court’s ruling is substantively correct or even harmless error,
especially as it has denied both of Mr. Tapp’s motions to augment the record. 
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the order granting summary disposition and
remand for further proceedings. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the district
court’s summary dismissal of the second successive petition and remand for further
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of May, 2016.
_____/s/________________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Christopher Tapp
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